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Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently,
philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory
results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others sug-
gest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers,
Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which
people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist
answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we investigated intuitions
about determinism and moral responsibility in patients suffering from behavioural fronto-
temporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction.
Thus, the ‘performance error model’ should predict that bvFTD patients will give less com-
patibilist answers. However, we found that bvFTD patients give answers quite similar to
subjects in control group and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the ‘per-
formance error model’ should be abandoned in favour of other available model that best ﬁt
our data.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Whether moral responsibility and determinism are compatible is a highly debated question among philosophers. ‘Com-
patibilist’ philosophers argue that we can be responsible for our actions in a deterministic world (and thus that moral
responsibility and determinism are compatible) while ‘incompatibilist’ philosophers claim that determinism is by nature a
threat to moral responsibility (and thus that moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible). Both sides have used
many arguments, most of which ultimately rely on appeal to folk intuitions (i.e. to laypeople’s untutored spontaneous judg-
ments about principles or particular cases). This concern about which position is the more intuitive and folk intuitions about. All rights reserved.
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ure of folk intuitions (Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2006).
However, determining whether laypeople are compatibilists or incompatibilists turned out to be more complicated than
expected: it was found that people’s answers were likely to vary from expressing compatibilism to expressing incompatib-
ilism depending on how the question was asked and the nature of the case. To account for these conﬂicting judgments,
Nichols and Knobe (2007; see also Nichols 2006) have proposed a ‘performance error model’, according to which compatib-
ilist judgments are the product of an emotional bias.
In this paper, we put this ‘performance error model’ to test by studying judgments about moral responsibility and deter-
minism made by patients suffering from a behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). People with bvFTD are
known to suffer from emotional deﬁcits. So, we argue, the ‘performance error model’ should predict decreased compatibilist
judgments in people with bvFTD. Nevertheless, we present data suggesting that people with bvFTD are no less likely to give
compatibilist answers than control participants. We conclude that Nichols and Knobe’s ‘performance error model’ should be
abandoned for other models that are more consistent with our results.
2. Folk intuitions about moral responsibility and determinism: three models
2.1. The relevance of folk intuitions to the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate
Imagine a world in which everything that happens is entirely caused by what has happened before according to immu-
table laws of nature – that is, a world in which everything that happens could be fully explained by the state of this world at
an antecedent time and predicted from the knowledge of this antecedent state and of the laws of nature. Such a world is
what philosophers call a deterministic world.1 Now, can people be morally responsible for their actions if they live in such a
world? ‘Compatibilist’ philosophers answer ‘yes’ while ‘incompatibilist’ philosophers say ‘no’. Both opposition positions entail
very different account of the nature of freedom and moral responsibility.
Within the philosophical debate about moral responsibility and determinism, appeal to folk intuitions plays an important
role (Nahmias et al., 2006). Thus, it is often considered that a theory of moral responsibility that is consistent with folk intu-
itions has a dialectical advantage, while the burden of proof falls on the shoulders of those who suggest that folk intuitions
might be widely mistaken.
This is why both sides typically claim that common sense is on their side, and this is how the debate over the compat-
ibility of moral responsibility and determinism has extended in a debate over the coherence of folk intuitions about moral
responsibility with either compatibilism or incompatibilism.2 For example, on the compatibilist side, Frankfurt (1969) has pro-
duced famous cases (since dubbed ‘Frankfurt cases’) in which we are supposed to have the intuition that an agent is morally
responsible in spite of the fact that he had to act the way he did.3 On the incompatibilist side, ‘Manipulation arguments’
(see Pereboom, 1995 for an example) have been trying to show that we have both the intuition that manipulated agents have
no moral responsibility and that there is no signiﬁcant difference between manipulated agents and agents living in a determin-
istic world.4 And ﬁnally, caught in the crossﬁre, ‘revisionist’ philosophers consider that our natural conception of moral respon-
sibility is incoherent and needs in fact to be revised (see for example Vargas, 2005). Of course, the plausibility of such a view
directly also depends on whether the revisionist’s account of the nature of folk intuitions about moral responsibility is correct
(Vargas, 2006), so that all three positions are in a way interested in the real nature of folk intuitions about free will and moral
responsibility.
2.2. Contradictory results in the experimental philosophy of free will
To settle this dispute, Nahmias and his colleagues (Nahmias et al., 2005; Nahmias et al., 2006) decided to empirically
investigate folk intuitions about moral responsibility. They gave participants short vignettes describing agents living in
deterministic universe, and asked whether this agent deserved blame for what he has done. Here is an example:
Supercomputer case:
Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and we build a supercomputer which can deduce from
these laws of nature and from the current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at
any future time. It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict everything about how it will be with
100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time
on March 25, 2150 AD, 20 years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information and the1 In this paper, we use ‘determinism’ in a very speciﬁc and laplacian sense according to which determinism implies predictability de jure. Philosophers also
use ‘determinism’ in a broader sense that does not necessarily imply such predictability. See for example Van Inwagen (1983).
2 For a study suggesting that laypeople have intuitions that differ from those of professional philosophers and that folk intuitions cannot be read off
philosophers’ intuitions, see Schulz, Cokely, and Feltz (2011).
3 For an empirical investigation of ‘Frankfurt cases’, see Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley (2006) and Miller and Feltz (2011).
4 For an empirical investigation of folk intuitions about the Manipulation argument, see Sripada (forthcoming).
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puter’s prediction is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195.
Imagine such a supercomputer actually did exist and actually could predict the future, including Jeremy’s robbing the
bank (and assume Jeremy does not know about the prediction). Do you think that when Jeremy robs the bank, he’s mor-
ally blameworthy for it?
In this particular case, 83% answered that Jeremy was morally blameworthy for having robbed the bank.5 This means that,
in this case, most participants considered that Jeremy could be morally responsible for his actions, while living in a determin-
istic world. This strongly suggests that people have compatibilist intuitions and similar results were obtained by Nahmias and
his colleagues for two other kinds of vignettes.
Nevertheless, things are far from being that simple. In a study by Nichols and Knobe (2007), subjects were presented with
the following description of two different universes:
Imagine a universe (Universe A) in which everything that happens is completely caused by whatever happened before it.
This is true from the very beginning of the universe, so what happened in the beginning of the universe caused what
happened next, and so on right up until the present. For example one day John decided to have French Fries at lunch. Like
everything else, this decision was completely caused by what happened before it. So, if everything in this universe was
exactly the same up until John made his decision, then it had to happen that John would decide to have French Fries.
Now imagine a universe (Universe B) in which almost everything that happens is completely caused by whatever hap-
pened before it. The one exception is human decision making. For example, one day Mary decided to have French Fries
at lunch. Since a person’s decision in this universe is not completely caused by what happened before it, even if every-
thing in the universe was exactly the same up until Mary made her decision, it did not have to happen that Mary would
decide to have French Fries. She could have decided to have something different.
The key difference, then, is that in Universe A every decision is completely caused by what happened before the decision –
given the past, each decision has to happen the way that it does. By contrast, in Universe B, decisions are not completely
caused by the past, and each human decision does not have to happen the way that it does.
Participants were then asked which one of these two universes was more like ours. Nearly all participants (90%) answered
‘Universe B’. Then, participants in the concrete condition received the following scenario:
Concrete condition:
In Universe A, a man named Bill has become attracted to his secretary, and he decides that the only way to be with her is
to kill his wife and 3 children. He knows that it is impossible to escape from his house in the event of a ﬁre. Before he
leaves on a business trip, he sets up a device in his basement that burns down the house and kills his family.
Is Billy fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children?
In this condition, most subjects (72%) gave the compatibilist answer according to which the agent was fully morally
responsible. These results are consistent with those obtained by Nahmias and his colleagues. But, let’s consider now the ab-
stract condition. Participants in this condition had no scenario to read (just the description if Universe A and Universe B) but
just received the following question:
Abstract condition:
In Universe A, is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions?
In this condition, most subjects (86%) gave the incompatibilist answer, according to which it is impossible for a person
living in Universe A to be fully morally responsible. Nichols and Knobe conclude that this shows that it is too simple to claim
that people are either compatibilists or incompatibilists: participants’ answers can vary depending on how the question is
framed.
2.3. Nichols and Knobe’s ‘performance error model’
How are we to account for these conﬂicting judgments? While some have argued that abstract and concrete scenarios
elicit different psychological mechanisms (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008), Nichols and Knobe have focused on the affective con-
trast between the abstract question and the concrete question. Indeed, the concrete question describes a gruesome and
revolting crime, while the phrasing of the abstract question is clearly dispassionate. So, it might be that compatibilist
answers are emotionally driven and that people are more compatibilist in the concrete case because the situation described
(a murder) is emotionally loaded. According to Nichols and Knobe’s ‘performance error model’, compatibilist answers are5 Other participants were asked whether Jeremy robbed the bank of his own free will. 76% of participants answered that he did. Though questions about free
will and moral responsibility are closely related, some philosophers have proposed that the two questions should be distinguished, and that we can be morally
responsible without having free will (see Fischer, 2002; for empirical researches on the folk concept of ‘free will’, see Monroe & Malle, 2010).). In this paper, we
leave out the question of free will and focus on moral responsibility. One reason for this is that our main experiment was run in French and that there is no
direct equivalent of ‘free will’ in French (the direct translation is ‘libre-arbitre’, but the term is more theologically connoted and much less common in French
than the English ‘free will’).
Table 1
Proportion of compatibilist answers for each condition in Nichols and Knobe’s experiment.
Agent in indeterminist universe (Universe B) (%) Agent in determinist universe (Universe A) (%)
High affect condition 95 64
Low affect condition 89 23
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To support this hypothesis, Nichols and Knobe designed two new conditions. The low affect condition was the following:
Low affect condition:
As he has done many times in the past, Mark arranges to cheat on his taxes. Is it possible that Mark is fully morally
responsible for cheating on his taxes?
While the high affect condition was the following:
High affect condition:
As he has done many times in the past, Bill stalks and rapes a stranger. Is it possible that Bill is fully morally responsible
for raping the stranger?
In each condition, for half of the subjects, the question stipulated that the agent was in Universe A while, for the other
half, the question stipulated that the agent was in Universe B. Table 1 describes, for each combination, the proportion of par-
ticipants who answered ‘yes’
Participants seemed to have very few compatibilist intuitions in the low affect condition situated in a determinist uni-
verse. For Nichols and Knobe, these experiments support the ‘performance error model’ according to which people have
an underlying incompatibilist theory that can be overcome by emotional compatibilist bias.6
To sum up: according to Nichols and Knobe, people are naturally incompatibilist. That’s why they give incompatibilist
answer in the abstract condition and the low-affect condition (the ‘low-affect cases’). Nevertheless, emotionally salient mor-
al violations can drive people to be biased to give compatibilist answers, and that is what happens in the concrete condition,
the high-affect condition (the ‘high-affect cases’) and the Supercomputer scenario (see Fig. 1).
2.4. Nahmias and Murray’s ‘error theory’
Nevertheless, Nahmias and Murray (2010) have recently proposed an ‘error theory’ according to which most incompatib-
ilist answers are in fact the product of confusion. According to Nahmias and Murray, most people who give incompatibilist
answers misunderstand determinism by confounding it with epiphenomenalism or fatalism, i.e. doctrines according to
which agents and their mental states do not have any role to play in the generation of their actions (as in cases of manip-
ulations in which the agent is directed by an external force) – an idea they call ‘bypassing’.7 Thus, the reason why so many
people are incompatibilist when confronted with Knobe and Nichols’ scenarios is that these scenarios are written in such a way
that they lead most people to misunderstand determinism as implying ‘bypassing’, possibly because of the words ‘it had to
happen’.
To test this hypothesis, Nahmias and Murray (2010) gave to participants a concrete version and an abstract version of
Nichols and Knobe’s ‘Universe A’ scenario8 as well as an abstract and a concrete version of a scenario in which the same uni-
verse keeps being re-created. Participants were not only asked if agents in these scenarios deserved praise or blame and acted
from their own free will, but they were also asked three questions designed to probe their understanding of what determinism
is. Here are sample questions for the concrete version in Universe A (involving Bill killing his wife and children). Participants had
to say on a scale how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:
 Decisions: Bill’s decision to kill his wife and children has no effect on what he ends up being caused to do.
 Wants: What Bill wants has no effect on what he ends up being caused to do.
 Believes: What Bill believes has no effect on what [he/she] ends up being caused to do.
 No control: Bill has no control over what he does.6 Note also that the low-affect condition and the high-affect condition are both concrete conditions, which suggests that the difference between the abstract
and the concrete condition cannot directly be explained in terms of ‘‘abstract versus concrete’’.
7 To quote Nahmias and Murray (2010): ‘‘What is ‘‘bypassing’’? The basic idea is that one’s actions are caused by forces that bypass one’s conscious self, or at
least what one identiﬁes as one’s ‘‘self’’. More speciﬁcally, it is the thesis that one’s actions are produced in a way that bypasses the abilities compatibilists
typically identify with free will, such as rational deliberation, conscious consideration of beliefs and desires, formation of higher-order volitions, planning, and
the like. As such, bypassing might take the form of epiphenomenalism about the relevant mental states (i.e., that deliberations, beliefs, and desires are causally
irrelevant to action), or it might take the form of fatalism—the belief that certain things will happen no matter what one decides or tries to do, or that one’s
actions have to happen even if the past had been different. Bypassing suggests that conscious agents have no control over their actions because they play no role
in the causal chain that leads to their actions.’’
8 That is: the abstract condition and the concrete condition involving Bill killing his wife and children.
Fig. 1. Nichols and Knobe’s ‘performance error model’.
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(for the four ﬁrst questions, the ‘bypassing’ answer is agreement; for the last question, it’s disagreement).
Nahmias and Murray’s results showed that compatibilist intuitions were highly correlated to a good understanding
of determinism (that is: an understanding of determinism that do not conﬂate it with bypassing) and that people who
gave incompatibilist answers were far more susceptible to believe that determinism entailed ‘bypassing’ (that is: the fact
that our mental states do not play any role in generating our actions). Furthermore, they found that Knobe and Nichols’
description of ‘Universe A’ scenario (in comparison to the ‘re-creating universe’ scenario) led a great number of participants
to think that mental states were ‘bypassed’ in this universe. Finally, they observed that people in the abstract condition were
more prone to believe in ‘bypassing’ than people in the concrete condition. They conclude that most incompatibilist answers
do not reveal a true commitment to incompatibilism, because most of them were the product of a bad understanding of
determinism.
To sum up: for Nahmias and Murray, people are naturally compatibilists. That’s why most of them give compatibilist
answers to the Supercomputer scenario. Nevertheless, some subjects still give incompatibilist answers, because they are
mistaken in thinking that determinism entail ‘bypassing’. Nichols and Knobe’s scenario is badly phrased, and drives more
subjects to make this mistake; hence the greater number of incompatibilist answers in the abstract condition and low-affect
condition. Nevertheless, in the concrete condition and the high-affect conditions, subjects seem to have a better understand-
ing of determinism and making less mistakes: this is why they give more compatibilist answers in these conditions (see
Fig. 2).
But, one might ask, why do people seem to have a better understanding of determinism in the concrete and high-affect
conditions? For Nahmias and Murray, the answer is, once more, affect:
‘‘it may be that the high negative affect causes participants to neglect the bypassing feature of the scenario. In other words,
[Nichols and Knobe]’s description of determinismmay lead people to make a mistake, which is then ‘‘cancelled out’’ in the
concrete case—but not in the abstract case—by high negative affect. Hence, we predict that most people will not read [Nic-
hols and Knobe’s] concrete scenario to involve bypassing, which may help to explain why they are generally willing to
attribute [moral responsibility] to Bill [for having killed his wife and children]’’.
Thus, in Nahmias and Murray’s account, affect still acts as a bias, but only as a ‘counter-bias’: affect can bias people to
ignore other biasing features, and this is why people are more prone to error in low-affect conditions and less in concrete
high-affect conditions. An error cancels an error.99 Note that Nahmias and Murray have also an alternative and compatible account for the difference between the abstract and the concrete condition
that doesn’t rely on affect. According to them, the concrete condition allows participants to have a better understanding of determinism, in particular by
making clear that the agent acts according to their desires: ‘‘Speciﬁcally, we believe that judgments about responsibility—including whether agents
deserve credit or blame for their actions—will be more reliable if they engage our capacities to think about the beliefs, desires, and intentions of agents
(e.g., our ‘‘theory of mind’’ capacities), and these are presumably more likely to be engaged when we consider speciﬁc agents in speciﬁc circumstances.
More generally, it may be that people’s intuitions are more reliable when they have more details about a scenario, which is likely part of the reason why
philosophers construct thought experiments with speciﬁc details to probe (or prime) our intuitions. Hence, while we agree with N&K that concrete cases
that also involve high affect may lead to errors, we do not believe this is a product of concreteness per se. Rather, we believe that, in general, concrete
cases are more likely to reveal reliable intuitions about [moral responsibility] and [free will] than are abstract cases.’’ Nevertheless, this hypothesis is not
enough to account for the difference between the low-conﬂict and the high-affect cases, and that is why Nahmias and Murray still need to postulate the
inﬂuence of affect as an auxiliary hypothesis.
Fig. 2. Nahmias and Murray’s ‘error theory’.
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the general framework of their ‘error theory’, grant that incompatibilist answers are due to misunderstanding, and that
subjects are less prone to such mistakes in concrete and high-affect conditions, and still adopt another auxiliary hypothesis
concerning why people are better in such cases. Thus, we have the choice between three different kinds of models:
1. Nichols and Knobe’s performance error model (N&K), according to which, in absence of affect, people give incompatibilist
answers,
2. Nahmias and Murray’s error theory supplemented by the affective counter-bias hypothesis (N&Mv1), according to which
people in ideal conditions are compatibilist (as in the Supercomputer scenario), but can give incompatibilist answers
when they take determinism as implying ‘‘bypassing’’, a tendency than can itself be countered by affect,
3. Nahmias and Murray’s error theorywithout the hypothesis of a role played by affect (N&Mv2), that is the theory according
to which people in ideal conditions are compatibilist, but can give incompatibilist answers when they take determinism
as implying ‘‘bypassing’’, a tendency that is diminished in concrete and high-affect cases, for a reason unknown but not
linked to affect.
3. How to decide between these accounts: different predictions for patients with emotional deﬁcits
3.1. How to decide between these accounts: a proposal
Now that we have three accounts, how are we to decide between them? We must ﬁnd a situation in which these three
kinds of account make different predictions and test it. One such situation, we suggest, is the putative answers given by
patients presenting emotional deﬁcits.
Studies on patients with emotional deﬁcits have been used several times in moral psychology to evaluate hypotheses pos-
tulating that a certain kind of answer is due to emotional reactions. For example, Knobe (2003) found that people were likely
to judge that an agent intentionally brough about a foreseen side effect, but only when this side effect was morally bad.10
Nadelhoffer (2006) proposed that attributions of intentionality for bad side effects were the product of a bias, and more pre-
cisely of an emotional reaction to the agent’s blameworthiness. To test for Nadelhoffer’s hypothesis, Young and his colleagues
(2006) gave Knobe’s scenarios to patients suffering from damages to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Indeed, if the pattern of
responses was due to emotional reactions, patients with this kind of lesions, because they show emotional deﬁcits, should be
less likely to display it. Nevertheless, Young and his colleagues found that the pattern of responses for patients with damages to
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was identical to the one of control subjects. They concluded that the pattern of responses
observed by Knobe was not the product of emotional reactions.
Similarly, on the basis of fMRI studies on the resolution of moral dilemmas, Greene et al. (2001); see also Greene, 2008)
suggested that utilitarian responses (sacriﬁce one to save many) were the product of cognitive processes while deontological
responses (refuse to sacriﬁce one, even to save many) were the product of emotional reactions. Thus, this hypothesis led to
the prediction that people with emotional deﬁcits and impoverished emotional responses should give more utilitarian
responses to moral dilemmas. This prediction was conﬁrmed by researches on patients suffering from a behavioural variant
of frontotemporal dementia (Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005) or from lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Cia-
ramelli, Muccioli, Làvadas, & Di Pellegrino, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007), thus lending support to Greene’s hypothesis (Greene,
2007).10 Evidence suggest that this effect, that has been dubbed the ‘Knobe effect’ or the ‘side-effect effect’, might not be limited to side effects but could also be
observed for means of action (see Cova & Naar, forthcoming).
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expect patients with emotional deﬁcits to be less likely to give this particular kind of answers. Thus, following this hypoth-
esis, if we take two scenarios (here, the Supercomputer and the concrete condition in which Bill kills his wife and children),
we can see our three models making very different predictions for people with emotional deﬁcits:
1. According to N&K, people are by default incompatibilists, unless they are biased by emotional reactions. Patients with
emotional deﬁcits are less likely to be biased by such reactions, so N&K should predict that they would give less compa-
tibilist answers to both the Supercomputer and the concrete condition.
2. According to N&Mv1, people are by default compatibilists. Nevertheless, when confronted to Nichols and Knobe’s descrip-
tion of determinism, they misunderstand determinism, which leads them to give incompatibilist answers, except for the
high-affect case, in which emotional reactions lead them to give the compatibilist answer. Given this account, patients
with emotional deﬁcits should be as likely as control subjects to give compatibilist answer to the Supercomputer case,
but more likely to give incompatibilist answers in the concrete condition.
3. According to N&Mv2, people are by default compatibilists. Nevertheless, when confronted to Nichols and Knobe’s descrip-
tion of determinism, they misunderstand determinism, which leads them to give incompatibilist answers, except for the
concrete condition, for an unknown reason unrelated to emotion reactions. Thus, according to this account, patients with
emotional deﬁcits should not differ in their answer from control subjects, as emotions do not play any role.
Each model predicts a different pattern of responses for patients with emotional deﬁcits. So, all we have to do to adjudi-
cate between these three models is to compare these predictions with answers actually given by patients with emotional
deﬁcits.
3.2. A case of emotional deﬁcit: behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia
Searching for such patients, we found a good example of emotional deﬁcit in the behavioural variant of frontotemporal
dementia (bvFTD). bvFTD is a subtype of frontotemporal lobe degeneration, a group of clinical syndromes associated with
focal atrophy of frontal and anterior temporal lobes, which also include semantic dementia and progressive nonﬂuent apha-
sia (Neary et al., 1998).
bvFTD is characterised by an early alteration in behaviour and personality with emotional blunting, social inappropriate-
ness and loss of insight (Piguet, Hornberger, Mioshi, & Hodges, 2011). Patients suffer from impairment in social cognition and
emotional processing, in particular during theory of mind or emotional identiﬁcation tests (Lavenu & Pasquier, 2005; Lough
et al., 2006; Torralva et al., 2007).
These deﬁcits in social cognition and emotional processing appear early in the disease and are speciﬁc compared to other
neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer Disease (Funkiewiez, Bertoux, de Souza, Lévy, & Dubois, 2012). They are a
consequence of the atrophy in orbitofrontal (OFC) and medial prefrontal (mPFC) cortices, two critical cerebral regions in-
volved in the social and emotional cognition that are early and speciﬁcally impaired in bvFTD (Boccardi et al., 2005; Broe
et al., 2003; Perry et al., 2006; Seeley et al., 2008; Tranfaglia, Palumbo, Siepi, Sinzinger, & Parnetti, 2009).
The role of OFC and mPFC in emotional processing has been widely established through imaging or lesion studies (Hornak
et al., 2003; Hornak et al., 2004; Ruby & Decety, 2004). OFC analyses the value of a reward or the affective signiﬁcance and
valence of a stimulus such as a facial or vocal emotions (Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & Mcgrath, 1994), and mPFC is considered as a
supramodal emotions representation area (Peelen, Atkinson, & Vuilleumier, 2010). Recent imaging ﬁndings in bvFTD made
the direct kink between atrophy of OFC and behavioural disturbances (Hornberger, Geng, & Hodges, 2011) or atrophy and
blood perfusion decrease of mPFC and emotional processing impairment (Bertoux et al., in preparation; Bertoux et al., sub-
mitted for publication).
Thus, bvFTD could be considered as amodel of OFC andmPFC dysfunction and emotional impairment and is a very relevant
choice to assess emotional implication in moral judgment. By contrast, we decided to recruit mild Alzheimer Disease (AD) pa-
tients as a control disease since neither these affective and social deﬁcits were showed in its mild forms (Funkiewiez et al.,
2011), nor of the cerebral area from the ‘‘emotional circuitry’’ are impaired in this disease (Rabinovici et al., 2007; Tranfaglia
et al., 2009).
4. Controlling for the material
4.1. First control experiment: simplifying Nichols and Knobe’ material
However, before actually running the experiment, we faced two worries about the use of Nichols and Knobe’s original
material: their scenarios, describing and comparing two universes, were too long and complicated for people potentially suf-
fering from cognitive impairments. Moreover, our subjects being French,11 we had to make sure that our translation and
shortening of their material did not alter the effect they discovered.11 All experiments presented in this paper have been run on French participants using French material.
Table 2
Aggregated scores for the ﬁrst control experiment.
High-affect case Low-affect case
Read ﬁrst 6.2 3.8
Read second 5.1 5.3
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High-Affect Case:
Imagine a universe in which everything that happens is completely caused by whatever happened before it. This is true
from the very beginning of the universe, so what happened in the beginning of the universe caused what happened next,
and so on right up until the present. For example one day John decided to have French Fries at lunch. Like everything else,
this decision was completely caused by what happened before it. So, if everything in this universe was exactly the same
up until John made his decision, then it had to happen that John would decide to have French Fries.
Thus, in this universe, every decision is completely causedby what happened before the decision – given the past, each
decision has to happen the way that it does.
In Universe A, a man named Bill has become attracted to his secretary, and he decides that the only way to be with her is
to kill his wife and 3 children. He knows that it is impossible to escape from his house in the event of a ﬁre. Before he
leaves on a business trip, he sets up a device in his basement that burns down the house and kills his family.
Our shortened ‘low-affect case’ was similar, except for the last paragraph, which we replaced with the text of Nichols and
Knobe’s low-affect condition (Mark cheating on his taxes).
To test for this new material, we recruited 20 participants at the Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique
in Paris,12 and gave them each of them the two scenarios. 10 received the ‘high-affect case’ ﬁrst and 10 received the ‘low-affect
case’ ﬁrst. After reading each scenario, subjects had to answer the three following questions (always in the same order) on scale
ranging from 1 to 7 (‘1’ being indicated as ‘NO’ and 7 being indicated as ‘YES’):
1. The ‘responsibility’ question: Is Bill morally responsible for the death of his wife and children? [Is Mark morally responsible
for having cheated on his taxes?]
2. The ‘blameworthiness’ question: Does Bill deserve blame for the death of his wife and children? [Does Mark deserve blame
for having cheated on his taxes?]
3. The ‘punishment’ question: Does Bill deserve a punishment for the death of his wife and children? [Does Mark deserve a
punishment for having cheated on his taxes?]
Because answers to the three questions turned out to be highly correlated, we averaged them to obtain an aggregated
score and used this aggregated score for our analyses (see Table 2).
A two-factor ANOVA with case (‘high-affect’ or ‘low-affect’) and order (‘high-affect ﬁrst’ or ‘low-affect ﬁrst’) as factors
revealed a signiﬁcant effect of case (F(1,18) = 10.8, p < 0.01) and a marginally signiﬁcant effect of order (F(1,18) = 0.4,
p < 0.10).
In a ﬁrst time, we only analysed scores for the ﬁrst scenario received by participants (in order to exclude order effects). As
in Nichols and Knobe’s original experiments, we found that people obtained higher score for the ‘high-affect case’ (M = 6.2)
than for the ‘low-affect’ case (M = 3.8). A Welch t-test proved this difference to be statistically signiﬁcant (N = 20, t = 3.2,
df = 17.6, p < 0.01). In a second time, we analysed all scores. Once again, we found that people obtained higher score for
the ‘high-affect case’ (M = 5.6) than for the ‘low-affect’ case (M = 4.6). A paired t-test proved this difference to be statistically
signiﬁcant (N = 20, t = 3.3, df = 19.0, p < 0.01). Thus, we were able to reproduce Nichols and Knobe’s original effect using sim-
pler vignettes.
Though previous researches revealed no order effects for Nichols and Knobe’s material (Feltz, Cokely, & Nadelhoffer,
2009), we observed that, overall, people who read the ‘high-affect case’ ﬁrst were more likely to give compatibilist answer
than those who read the ‘low-affect case’ ﬁrst (M = 5.8 vs.M = 4.4), a tendency revealed marginally signiﬁcant by our ANOVA.
As shown by Table 1 this tendency can be decomposed in a tendency for subjects reading the ‘high-affect case’ ﬁrst to give
more compatibilist answers to the ‘low-affect case’ and a tendency for subjects reading the ‘low-affect case’ ﬁrst to give less
compatibilist answers to the ‘high-affect case’. Nevertheless, probably due to our small sample size, only the ﬁrst tendency
reached marginal signiﬁcance (Welch t-test: N = 20, t = 1.9, df = 18.0, p = 0.07).12 The age mean was 22.8. 15 participants were women. We intentionally used small groups to check whether the effect could be observed within a small
number of participants, given that our sample of patients was likely to be small.
13 The age mean was 24.7. 13 participants were women.
Table 3
Aggregated scores for the second control experiment.
High-affect case Supercomputer
Read ﬁrst 6.5 6.7
Read second 6.2 5.7
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After having veriﬁed that our simpliﬁed version of the ‘high-affect case’ generated the same effect than the original case,
we had to check for the presence of order effects when this case is given with the Supercomputer case. To test for this, we
recruited 20 participants at the Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique in Paris,13 and gave them each of
them the two scenarios. 10 received the ‘high-affect case’ ﬁrst and 10 received the Supercomputer case ﬁrst. After reading each
scenario, subjects had to answer the three same questions than in our ﬁrst control experiment (the ‘responsibility’, the ‘blame-
worthiness’ and the ‘punishment’ question).
As for our ﬁrst control experiment, we averaged responses to the three questions in an aggregated score. We then run an
ANOVA using scores as dependent variable and case (‘Supercomputer’ or ‘high-affect case’) and order (‘Supercomputer ﬁrst’
or ‘high-affect case ﬁrst) as factors. We found no effect of case (F(1,35) = 0.1, p = 0.74) or order (F(1,35) = 0.8, p = 0.38), but
found a signiﬁcant interaction effect between these two factors (F(1,35) = 4.5, p < 0.05).
As suggested by the results presented in Table 3, this interaction effect might be due to the fact that ratings for the ‘Super-
computer case’ seems to be more inﬂuenced by the order of presentation than ratings for the ‘high-affect case’. This might be
due to the fact that people reading the ‘high-affect case’ ﬁrst have already rated a horrible crime when they read the ‘Super-
computer case’ and lower their ratings because robbing a bank is less wrong than killing his whole family. On the contrary,
people reading the ‘Supercomputer’ ﬁrst gives high ratings to this scenario, and must logically continue to give high ratings
to the ‘high-affect case’. However, the inﬂuence of order on ratings for the Supercomputer case only reached marginal sig-
niﬁcance (Welch t-test: N = 20, t = 1.9, df = 9.6, p = 0.09).
Thus, as long as we use small samples in our experiment, there do not seem to be reasons to be worried about the po-
tential interference of order effects.
4.3. Gender effects
Finally, note that an ANOVA with aggregated ratings as dependent variable and gender as a factor revealed a signiﬁcant
gender effect in our ﬁrst control experiment (F(1,18) = 7.3, p < 0.05). Overall, women gave more compatibilist answers than
men (M = 5.6 vsM = 3.5), a tendency already observed in the literature (Buckwalter & Stich, forthcoming; Holtzman, in prep-
aration). Nevertheless, no such gender effect was found in our second control experiment (maybe due to a ceiling effect). Post-
hoc analyses revealed that, in the ﬁrst control experiment, difference between genders was only signiﬁcant for the ‘low-affect
case’ (Welch t-test: N = 20, t = 3.1, df = 6.9, p < 0.05)14 and not for the ‘high-affect case’, (Welch t-test: N = 20, t = 1.3, df = 4.5,
p = 0.26), which might explain why we did not observe it in the second experiment, since we did not use the ‘low-affect case’.
Each of the accounts we have presented suggest a different account of this difference. Nichols and Knobe’s ‘performance
error model’ might explain the gender effect by suggesting that women are more sensible to the affective bias, whether be-
cause their affective reaction was higher or they were more likely to be inﬂuenced by their affective reaction. The affect-free
version of Nahmias and Murray’s ‘error theory’ could propose that women are less likely than men to confound determinism
with bypassing. Finally, the original version of Nahmias and Murray’s ‘error theory’, that still gives a role to affect, might
choose between these two accounts, or even endorse a mix of both. Anyway, it seems that, as long as do not use the
‘low-affect case’, gender effects should not be an issue.
5. Frontotemporal dementia and judgments of moral responsibility: Running the experiment
5.1. Participants
Participants were ten patients (5 women and 5men, 78.0 ± 8,9 years old, range 59–86; disease duration = 3.61 years ± 2.4)
who met the criteria for AD (Dubois et al., 2007), twelve patients (5 women and 7 men, 66.5 ± 10.2 years old, range 48–82;
disease duration = 3.0 years ± 1.7) who met the criteria for bvFTD (Neary et al., 1998) and ten control subjects (5 women
and 5 men, 66.0 ± 7.1 years old, range 55–73).
All patients were evaluated by neurologists with clinical experience in neurodegenerative diseases, and were given a
complete neurological and behavioural assessment. This examination conﬁrmed a history of initial progressive decline in
social interpersonal conduct and behaviour in bvFTD, with emotional blunting and loss of insight. In AD, it conﬁrmed a his-
tory of episodic memory impairment with temporal and spatial disorientation.14 M(women)=5.2 vs. M(men)=2.7.
Table 4
Characteristics of bvFTD and AD patients and neuropsychological data.
Control subjects AD bvFTD
Age 66.0 (7.1) 78.0 (8.9) 66.5 (10.2)
Gender 5 W/5 M 5W/5 M 5W/7 M
Educational level 5.2 (1.3) 5.2 (3.0) 5.7 (1.6)
Duration of disease 3.6 (2.4) 3.0 (1.7)
Neuropsychological Assessment
MMSE (/30) 28.9 (1) 22.7 (3.2)a 25.2 (2.7)a
FAB (/18) 17.3 (0.9) 14.9 (1.5)a 14.3 (1.9)a
Facial emotional recognition (%) 46.8 (11.7)a
Faux-Pas test
Faux-Pas detection and explanation (/40) 17.6 (4.5)a
Control questions (/20) 18.2 (1.8)a
Mean (standard deviation).
a Represent a pathologic scores according to normative data on healthy subjects.
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Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) and the Frontal Assessment Battery (Dubois, Slachevsky, Litvan, & Pillon, 2000). In bvFTD patients,
we also evaluate theory of mind abilities with the Faux-Pas test (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998) and facial emotional
recognition with 35 faces from Ekman pictures (Ekman and Friesen, 1975) except for two bvFTD patients who were not as-
sessed with these two last tests. Clinical and neuropsychological data are presented on Table 3. Structural MRI and SPECT
were performed for all patients and revealed fronto-temporal atrophy and/or hypoperfusion in bvFTD and median-tempo-
ral/parietal atrophy in AD. To improve diagnostic accuracy, all patients were clinically followed for at least 18 months.
Patients were not included if they presented any of the following: (1) language complaints (progressive non-ﬂuent apha-
sia or semantic dementia); (2) systemic illnesses that could interfere with cognitive functioning; (3) vascular lesions on MRI
or neurological history suggestive of vascular dementia; (4) motor-neuron disease; (5) major depression; (6) use of anxio-
lytics or antipsychotics drugs.
This study was conducted at the Institute of Memory and Alzheimer Disease, and in Neurology department (Pitié-Sal-
pêtrière Hospital). All clinical and neuroimaging data were generated during a routine clinical work-up and were extracted
for the purpose of this study. Therefore, according to French legislation, explicit informed consent was waived. However, reg-
ulations concerning electronic ﬁling were followed, and patients and their relatives were informed that individual data
might be used in retrospective clinical research studies.
5.2. Procedure
Each participant received the ‘high-affect case’ ﬁrst and the ‘Supercomputer case’ in second. After each scenario, subjects
had to answer the three same questions than in our control experiments (the ‘responsibility’, the ‘blameworthiness’ and the
‘punishment’ question).
bvFTD patients also underwent an emotion recognition test and a theory of mind evaluation. In the emotion recognition
test, thirty-ﬁve faces from Ekman pictures (Ekman et al., 1975) were presented, and the patient should indicate which emo-
tion was expressed, among a list (presented in the top of the screen). Faces expressed seven different emotions (fear, sadness,
disgust, surprise, anger, happiness and neutral). A general recognition percentage was calculated. To assess theory of mind,
we used a short (ten stories) version of the Faux-pas test (Stone et al., 1998) in which patient have to detect and explain
social inconveniences.
5.3. Results
5.3.1. Neuropsychological examination
First, our groups differed from age (F(2,37) = 8.5, p < 0.01). AD patients were more aged than bvFTD and control subjects.
This age effect is inherent to the diseases we chose, since AD is an elderly disease that mostly appears after 70 years old,
while FTD mostly occur near 65 years old. However, they did not differ for educational level (F(2,37) = 1.0, p < 0.60) and
duration disease for patients (U Mann–Whitney, Z = 0.17, p = 0.91).
Also, our patient groups were matched for general cognitive efﬁciency (MMS) (Z = 1.3, p = 0.19) and executive dysfunction
(FAB) (Z = 0.9, p = 0.36).
Finally, bvFTD patients were impaired in facial emotions recognition test and in theory of mind evaluation compared to
matched control subjects recruited in a previous study (Funkiewiez et al., 2012) (see Table 4 for a summary of results).
5.3.2. High-affect case
We analysed results for both cases separately. For the ‘high-affect case’, four ANOVAs with group of subjects as a factor
(control subjects, AD patients, and bvFTD patients) revealed no signiﬁcant effect of pathology either on ‘blameworthiness’
Fig. 3. Mean answers for each question and each group of participants in the ‘high-affect case’. Error bars indicate standard deviation.
Fig. 4. Mean answers for each question and each group of participants in the ‘Supercomputer case’. Error bars indicate standard deviation.
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aggregated scores (F(2,29) = 1.7, p = 0.21).
No subjects gave a response below the middle of the scale (4.0) for the ‘responsibility’ and ‘blameworthiness’ questions.
For the ‘punishment’ question, only one bvFTD patient gave a response below the midpoint. Thus, subjects in three groups
gave mainly compatibilist answers to the ‘high-affect case’ (see Fig. 3).
5.3.3. Supercomputer case
For the ‘Supercomputer case’, four ANOVAs with group of subjects as a factor revealed no signiﬁcant effect on ‘responsi-
bility’ ratings (F(2,29) = 1.6, p = 0.21), ‘blameworthiness ratings’ (F(2,29) = 0.66, p = 0.53), ‘punishment’ ratings (F(2,29) = 0.7,
p = 0.49) and aggregated scores (F(2,29) = 1.1, p = 0.36).
As for the ‘high-affect case’, subjects in all three groups gave mainly compatibilist answers (see Fig. 4). Only three subjects
gave responses below the scale for at least one question. Two were control subjects and one was a bvFTD patient.
6. Discussion
6.1. Implication and interpretation of our results
Our results for both the High-affect and the Supercomputer case seem straightforward: in both cases, bvFTD patients did
not give signiﬁcantly less compatibilist answers than control subjects. In fact, in the Supercomputer case, they even gave
more compatibilist answer than control participants (aggregated scores: M = 5.8 vs. M = 6.1). This goes directly against
the predictions that can be drawn from Nichols and Knobe’s ‘performance error model’. Indeed, for the ‘performance error
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patibilist principles. Thus, the ‘performance error model’ has for consequences that a subject with impoverished emotional
reactions should tend to give less compatibilist answers and more incompatibilist answers. Clearly, this prediction does not
match the results we obtained: bvFTD patients with impoverished emotional reactions were not less likely to give compa-
tibilist answers and, overall, gave mostly compatibilist answers. It seems that the ‘performance error model’ cannot account
for these results.
Nahmias and Murray’s ‘error theory’, on the contrary, is fully compatible with these results: people are natural compatib-
ilists and this is why, control subjects or patients, they mostly give compatibilist answers. However, we saw that, to explain
Nichols and Knobe’s results, Nahmias and Murray needed to add two supplementary hypotheses: ﬁrst, that Nichols and
Knobe’s scenario are written in such way that people reading it are biased towards incompabilist answers by understanding
determinismas entailing bypassing; second, that this ﬁrst bias is cancelled by some ‘counter-bias’ in the high-affect scenario. It
is the nature of this ‘counter-bias’ that we now question: is it really the product of affective reaction, as suggested by Nahmias
and Murray?
If this ‘counter-bias’ is really the product of an emotional response, then it should be absent in patients with emotional
deﬁcits, and these patients should tend to give less compatibilist answers in the ‘high-affect case’ (and in the ‘high-affect
case’ only). What does our result suggest on this point? That it is not the case, so it seems that the ‘affective counter-bias’
hypothesis in Nichols and Murray’s ‘error theory’ should be replaced by another auxiliary hypothesis for.
A last worry is whether our results can be explained away by certains peculiarities of bvFTD’s patients. A ﬁrst possibility
could be that bvFTD patients answer according to a very rudimentary strategy consisting in fully condemning action that are
clear moral transgression, determinism notwithstanding, and that this strategy would explain their seemingly compatibilist
answers. However, such a hypothesis would be at odd with other ﬁndings about bvFTD patients’ moral judgments. We
already mentioned Mendez et al.’s study of bvFTD patients’ answers to moral dilemmas. What they found was that bvFTD
patients were more likely to judge morally acceptable the sacriﬁce of one person to save ﬁve others (including in the case in
which sacriﬁcing the person amounted to pushing her under a trolley). This pattern of answers is not compatible with the
hypothesis according to which bvFTD patients would rely on a very crude strategy of condemning any apparent moral
transgression.
A second possibility would be that our results could be explained by the bvFTD patients’ deﬁcit in theory-of-mind, as re-
vealed by the Faux-Pas test. However, we do not think so: even if bvFTD had a tendency to overattribute bad intentions and
goals to agents (which seems difﬁcult, given that they really have bad intentions and goals), this would not be enough to
explain away their compatibilist answers. Indeed, if bvFTD patients had the tendency to consider that an agent is responsible
for his action in a deterministic world given that he had the relevant intentions, this would simply mean, once again, that
bvFTD patients are compatibilists. Whether one is compatibilist or incompatibilist is not a question a theory-of-mind: it is a
question of what one thinks to be the necessary and sufﬁcient component of moral responsibility.
Nevertheless, though such an answer would be enough against an advocate of Nichols and Knobe’s ‘performance error
model’, it would still leave one possibility open for an advocate of Nahmias and Murray’s ‘affective counter-bias’. This advo-
cate could advance the following hypothesis: Nichols and Knobe’s scenarios lead people to think that people’s intentions
have no effect in the production of their action – but this error is corrected by an affective counter-bias in high-affect cases.
Surely, bvFTD patients should not beneﬁt from this emotional correction and thus give incompatibilist answers, but their
own bias (to overattribute intention) does the same work, and this is why there is no apparent difference between control
participants and bvFTD patients in our experiment.
This is indeed a possibility. Nevertheless, we think this hypothesis has a certain disadvantage: as it postulates two differ-
ent ‘counter-bias’ to account for our data, it is more costly that an hypothesis that would abandon the idea of an emotional
‘counter-bias’ to account for control participants and bvFTD patients’ answers in the same way. Thus, if such an account
existed, it would be more attractive that such a cumbersome (but still plausible) account.15
6.2. Beyond emotion: apathetic accounts of intuitions about moral responsibility
So the question is: is there any plausible account of folk intuitions about determinism andmoral responsibility whowould
account for existing data without appealing to emotional reactions? There are two main possibilities for such accounts.
The ﬁrst possibility is to reject both Nichols and Knobe and Nahmias and Murray’s theories to propose a radically novel
and alternative account. This is for example what Mandelbaum and Ripley (submitted for publication) have done by advanc-
ing the NBAR hypothesis (where NBAR stands for ‘Norm Broken, Agent Responsible’). According to them, we have an uncon-
scious belief that whenever a norm is broken, an agent is responsible for breaking the norm. In abstract cases, that belief does
not play any role and we, being natural incompatibilists, give incompatibilist answer. Nevertheless, in concrete cases, in
which norms are broken, this belief will clash with our natural incompatibilism. People will ﬁnally reduce this cognitive dis-
sonance by overriding their incompatibilist intuitions and give compatibilist answers.15 Also note that this hypothesis makes the following prediction: bvFTD patients should give more compatibilist answers than control subjects for the ‘low-
affect case’ (cheating on one’s taxes). Indeed, in such a case, control subjects should not beneﬁt from the ‘affective counter-bias’ while patients should still
beneﬁt from their ‘overattribution counter-bias’.
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difference between the high-affect cases (killing one’s family, raping a stranger) in which people give mostly compatibilist
answers and the low-affect case (cheating on one’s taxes) in which people give mostly incompatibilist answers. Nevertheless,
this could be explained by making the hypothesis that cheating on one’s taxes is a less salient violation than, say, raping a
stranger.
The second difﬁculty is that Nahmias and his colleagues (2006) have produced a scenario in which participants give
mostly compatibilist answers while the agent just goes jogging. As going jogging hardly seems a norm violation, this case
poses a problem for the NBAR hypothesis. Nevertheless, this hypothesis is a clear example of account that does not rely
on participants’ affective reactions and would explain why control participants and bvFTD give the same answers.
Another possibility, though, consists in keeping Nahmias and Murray’s error theory but trading their ‘affective counter-
bias’ hypothesis for another auxiliary hypothesis that would not rely on participants’ affective reactions. Here is a possibility:
that Nichols and Knobe’s scenarios lead people to have a wrong reading of determinism. More precisely, they understand
that people in Universe A are forced to do what they do. But, in concrete cases, this reading can be corrected if people ﬁnd
it implausible that an agent can be forced to act as described in the vignette. Thus, people might ﬁnd plausible that someone
could be in a situation where she is forced to cheat on her taxes (for example by lack of money) and then stick to the wrong
reading of determinism and give incompatibilist answer. But, it might also be that people ﬁnd hard to imagine a situation in
which one would be forced to rape a stranger, and then correct their reading of determinism to the correct one, thus giving
compatibilist answers. Though we are currently in the process of testing this hypothesis and cannot assert whether it is the
right one or not, it still is an example of how Nahmias and Murray’s ‘error theory’ can be kept while renouncing to use emo-
tional reactions to account for participants’ answers.7. Conclusion
Nichols and Knobe’s ‘performance error model’ and Nahmias and Murray’s ‘error theory’ are the most prominent accounts
of patterns in folk intuitions about the relationship between determinism and moral responsibility. Each theory has its own
weaknesses: for example, while the ‘performance error model’ cannot explain why participants still give compatibilist
responses to affect-free neutral scenarios (the ‘jogger case’ in Nahmias et al., 2006), Nahmias and Murray have to forge aux-
iliary hypotheses to explain why people seem to better understand determinism in the concrete high-affect cases. In this
paper, we sought to adjudicate the conﬂict between those two theories by studying intuitions about determinism and moral
responsibility in patients suffering from bvFTD. We found that patients with bvFTD, who suffer from emotional impairment,
did not answer differently from control subjects. This suggests, contra Nichols and Knobe’s ‘performance error model’, that
emotional reactions do not play a key role in generating compatibilist answers. As Nahmias and Murray’s ‘error theory’ is on
the contrary perfectly consistent with our results, we conclude that people should prefer their ‘error theory’ over Nichols and
Knobe’s ‘performance error model’. Nevertheless, we suggest that their auxiliary hypothesis according to which emotions
explain the difference between the low-affect and the high-affect case in Nichols and Knobe’s experimental paradigm should
be changed for an affect-free explanation of this difference.
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